Identity theft and foreclosure surpluses: CTC Real Estate Servs. v Lepe, 2006 by Bernhardt, Roger
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications Faculty Scholarship
2006
Identity theft and foreclosure surpluses: CTC Real
Estate Servs. v Lepe, 2006
Roger Bernhardt
Golden Gate University School of Law, rbernhardt@ggu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bernhardt, Roger, "Identity theft and foreclosure surpluses: CTC Real Estate Servs. v Lepe, 2006" (2006). Publications. Paper 303.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/303
Identity theft and foreclosure surpluses: 
CTC Real Estate Servs. v Lepe, 2006 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Identity theft victim whose personal information was used to obtain loan secured by deed 
of trust to acquire real property may recover undistributed surplus proceeds that remained 
after trustee sale.   CTC Real Estate Servs. v Lepe (2006) 140 CA4th 856, 44 CR3d 823 
In an act of identity theft, an unknown perpetrator used Lepe’s name, personal information, 
and credit to purchase real property and obtain a loan secured by a purchase money deed of trust. 
Without her knowledge, title to the property was taken in Lepe’s name and her name was signed 
on a promissory note as the maker and on a deed of trust as trustor. 
The beneficiary under the deed of trust foreclosed. CTC Real Estate Services (CTC), the 
trustee, sold the property at a trustee sale. Surplus funds remained after payments to the 
lienholders. CTC petitioned the trial court under CC §2924j(c) for an order allowing the deposit 
of the balance of the surplus proceeds less attorney fees and costs and discharging CTC from any 
further responsibility. CTC explained that while it believed the equitable and fair result would be 
to have Lepe receive the surplus funds, it was unable to distribute them to her because she was 
not the actual trustor of the foreclosed deed of trust as required by CC §2924k(a)(4). The trial 
court discharged CTC from further responsibility and approved its request for attorney fees and 
costs. 
Lepe submitted, under CC §2924j(a)(4), (d), what turned out to be the only claim for the 
undistributed surplus funds, asserting the right because her name and Social Security number had 
been used fraudulently by the wrongdoer to obtain funding for the purchase of property. She 
added that the foreclosure damaged her credit record and required her to spend considerable time 
dealing with the consequences: A bankruptcy proceeding had been filed in her name without her 
knowledge; her credit card accounts had been closed; and she was unable to borrow money for a 
home she intended to purchase. The trial court rejected Lepe’s claim, ordering the surplus to be 
paid into the county general fund. 
The court of appeal reversed. Personal identifying information can be the object of theft. Lepe 
established that her personal identifying information was misappropriated and used to obtain the 
property. The lending institution would have paid the surplus to the identity thief had he or she 
continued in the fraudulent activity. In that circumstance, Lepe would have been able to recover 
the surplus from the identity thief because the thif engaged in a fraudulent transaction by which 
he or she would have been unjustly enriched. 
The mere fortuity that the wrongdoer disappeared without receiving the surplus and was not 
subject to legal action should not, as a matter of equity, have precluded Lepe from recovering the 
funds not in the thief’s possession. Lepe had an equitable interest in the surplus funds from the 
foreclosure sale to which no one else asserted a claim or interest. Because a crime victim is 
entitled to trace stolen assets into other assets and obtain the final product, even though it may 
exceed the value of that which was stolen, Lepe was entitled to the product of the identity theft. 
Moreover, Lepe suffered substantial damages as a reult of the identity theft. 
The appellate court directed the trial court to enter an order granting Lepe’s claim for payment 
of the undistributed surplus funds remaining after the award to CTC of its attorney fees and 
costs. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: The trial court’s outcome was so sensible that it was a shame that 
Lepe’s attorney had to go up to the court of appeal to reach it. But obviously, both the trial 
and the appellate court took the matter seriously, as is shown by their shared refusal to 
accept the easy way out that a constructive trust explanation would provide and the 
reviewing court’s invention of a more complicated restitution and unjust enrichment 
analysis to get the same result.  
The appellate court’s theory also has more far-ranging consequences than Lepe’s 
straightforward constructive trust claim, since it should also work to protect other unpaid 
creditors victimized by the same scam and entitle them to share in the surplus along with 
Lepe. I can think of three possible other parties who might claim some part of the surplus as 
restitution for their losses:  
1. The thief has disappeared and we cannot know precisely how his scheme worked, but 
it would not have made sense for him to have made a ownpayment out of his own pocket; 
he somehow or other must have obtained 100 percent or 100 percent plus financing. Was 
this from the seller? (There were two mortgages on the property; it is unlikely that the 
second one was hard money.) Could the seller make som  kind of claim to the surplus, over 
and above payment of her note and deed of trust? She was the last identifiable owner of the 
property (the predecessor, if not the successor in interest), and that perhaps should count for 
something.  
2. Was the thief’s bankruptcy filing done only to stall the foreclosure, or were other 
creditors listed on the schedules? If they were victim zed by theft of the same identity, even 
if in other transactions, might not they claim this surplus as restitution, since constructive 
trust (and its tracing requirement) was not the theory used? 
3. It is unlikely that the thief went through all of this effort just to own empty property, 
which makes me suspect that he was probably rent skimming as well. See CC §890. If 
tenants were defrauded out of security deposits or subsequently evicted by the foreclosure, 
then they too should have some claim to that surplus. 
Anyway, if the thief is still around, I’d like to propose my name for his next acquisition. 
As long as he sticks to acquiring single family houses, where I will have antideficiency 
protection if the market turns down, I would even be willing to split any surplus with him if 
it goes up instead.—Roger Bernhardt 
 
